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Narratives & Mechanisms 
Abstract 
Historical scientists are frequently concerned with narrative explanations targeting single cases. I show 
that two distinct explanatory strategies are employed in narratives, simple and complex. A simple 
narrative has minimal causal detail and is embedded in a general regularity, whereas a complex 
narrative is more detailed and not embedded. This distinction’s importance is illustrated in reference to 
mechanistic explanation. I consider ‘liberal’ accounts of mechanistic explanation, which expand the 
traditional picture to accommodate less mechanistic sciences. Simple narratives warrant a mechanistic 
treatment, while some complex narratives do not.  
Introduction 
Scientists examining the past are taken to be primarily concerned with narrative explanations which 
account for single events1. A meteor exterminated the dinosaurs; New Zealand’s lake Taupo was formed 
by an enormous volcanic eruption; the introduction of small-pox killed millions in the Americas. Of 
course, historical scientists are not narrowly concerned with narrative explanation. As Kosso (2001) and 
Jeffares (2008) discuss, they sometime target middle-range theories which connect contemporary 
phenomena to past events (see also Turner 2009). Moreover, much historical enquiry targets patterns 
and regularities in deep time. Paleobiological work covering the nature of mass extinction events (Raup 
1991) the nature of speciation (Eldredge & Gould 1972), the role of selection and adaptationist 
explanations in macro-level patterns (Gould et al 1977, Huss 2009), are all concerned  with regularities in 
life’s shape, not the explanation of a simple event. However, at least much of the time their explanatory 
interests are geared towards the particular rather than the general. This paper shows that historical 
explanation, understood as narrative, is disunified: at least two distinct explanatory strategies are 
employed. Simple narratives explain particular cases as instances of regularities – the explanandum is 
subsumed by a general model. Complex narratives do not account for explananda in terms of 
regularities or models.  
I argue that simple narratives have more in common with the population-level explanations furnished by 
economists and ecologists than complex narratives. This is demonstrated by comparing narrative 
explanations with mechanistic models. Both population-level and simple narratives are amenable to 
                                                          
1
 For example, Kitcher 1993, Cleland 2011, Hempel 1965 and Hull 1975 appear to agree that historical enquiry is 
primarily narrative 
 2 
 
mechanistic gloss. However, in complex cases scientists are not typically mechanists. Faced with a 
complex world, they employ characteristically non-mechanistic explanations. 
The paper is in three parts. In the first, two case-studies illustrate the distinction between simple and 
complex narratives. Part two discusses mechanistic explanation, sketching the view and introducing 
liberalism – the view that most or all scientific explanation is mechanistic. The third part examines 
narrative explanation in light of mechanistic explanation, arguing that simple narratives are 
characteristically mechanistic, while some complex narratives are not.  
1. Narrative Explanations 
Narrative explanations account for particular events2 via causal sequences concluding with the 
explanandum. The causal sequence makes the explanandum likely. Narrative explanations are taken to 
be distinctively historiographical (at least by Hempel and Hull) due to their ‘story-like’ structure and lack 
of appeal to laws. The treaties at the close of the First World War led inevitably to the Second; the 
extraterrestrial impact which caused the Chicxulub crater was sufficient to exterminate the dinosaurs; 
and so on. There is more than one way to account for an event, however. Some causal sequences stand 
alone: even if only one extinction event was caused by an impact, we can be convinced of the impact’s 
causal sufficiency. Or we might explain an event as an instance of a general model: perhaps all wars 
have common causes, and the Second World War can be explained in terms of those commonalities. 
I will be agnostic as to whether all narratives in fact reference regularities, and whether this is 
problematic. Hempel’s primary concern about historiographic explanation is the lack of nomological 
appeals and I (in part) share the suspicion that particular events can be satisfactorily explained without 
recourse to regularities (c.f Tucker 1998) but my claim of the disjunctive nature of narratives holds 
regardless of this. 
Hopefully it is clear that narrative explanations are surely not restricted to historiographical inquiry – 
there is nothing stopping a chemist explaining a single event in terms of some causal sequence (perhaps 
even without explicit mention of laws) - and therefore the claims I make about narrative explanation will 
most likely not be restricted to the geological and paleontological cases I focus on. Whether the 
distinctions and lessons I draw are extendable to other sciences I leave for future work: given that 
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 I will speak in terms of past events, but historical enquiry also covers historical processes, entities and states of 
affairs. The claims made about events carry over to those other types of targets. 
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narrative explanation is paradigmatically the business of historical inquiry, it is the obvious place to 
center philosophical investigations 
 And so narrative explanations (1) account for some particular explanandum in terms of some causal 
sequence; (2) may or may not appeal explicitly to laws or generalizations; (3) are paradigmatically, but 
not exclusively, historical. I argue that there are two explanatory strategies which historical scientists 
employ in providing narratives. 
1.1 Snowball Earth 
There were glaciers in the tropics at least twice during the Neoproterozoic (roughly 1000 – 542 million 
years ago). Towards the end of the period there was synchronous, ubiquitous glaciation: the entire earth 
covered in permafrost cut through by rivers of ice. This presents a series of geological and 
palaeoclimatological challenges. What could have caused this scenario? How did it thaw? Why are such 
events rare? The most popular explanation of these glacial events is Joseph Kirschvink’s Snowball Earth 
Theory (Schopf & Klein 1992, Hoffman & Schrag 2002).  
The late Neoproterozoic was a time of continental dispersal: the supercontinent Rodinia broke up and 
the megacontinent Gondwana began to form. During glacial periods most continents clustered at the 
middle and lower latitudes. Kirshvink proposed that this clustering was responsible for the global freeze. 
Both land and ice-caps have high albedo – they reflect more of the sun’s energy than water. Tropical 
landmasses have high albedo because more sunlight reaches the equator. Their warm, moist climate 
also increases silicate weathering (the absorption of C02). Land clustering around the tropics, then, 
increases albedo and decreases greenhouse gases. This would lower the earth’s temperature – 
particularly at the poles where the growth of ice sheets would lead to a freezing feedback loop: 
If more than about half of the Earth’s surface area were to become ice covered, the albedo 
feedback would be unstoppable… surface temperatures would plummet, and pack ice would 
quickly envelope the tropical oceans (Hoffman & Schrag pp 135) 
The explanation can be presented in a simple flowchart: 
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Landmass Clustering Thinner Atmosphere
Higher Albedo Lower Temperatures
Increased Icepack
 
Figure 1: Snowball Earth 
Landmass clustering in the tropics lowers temperature by increasing albedo and thinning the 
atmosphere. Lower temperatures increase icepack cover, creating a feedback loop between lowering 
temperatures, larger icecaps, and higher albedo. Earth freezes over. As we shall see, Snowball Earth is a 
paradigm ‘simple’ narrative: an event is explained by a general model with reference to minimal causal 
factors. 
1.2 Sauropod Gigantism 
Despite public perception, most dinosaurs fit comfortably in the familiar mammalian size-range. The 
sauropods were different: not merely big, but puzzlingly so. Some were the largest land animals to have 
ever lived: Sauroposeidon and Argentinosaurus are estimated to have weighed between 50 and 70 tons, 
rivaling baleen whales in length. By contrast, the largest known terrestrial mammal was 
Paraceratherium, thought to be 12 meters long and weighing 20 tons at most. How did sauropods 
manage such sizes? Why was it unique? How was gigantism physiologically and evolutionarily possible?  
As Sander, Christian et al (2011) review, sauropod gigantism was the result of myriad causes (see also 
Klein et al 2011). Sauropods were the right lineage, in the right place, at the right time. They had specific 
primitive characteristics which removed size limitations. Early sauropods were oviparous – egg-laying 
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allows for fast population recovery, mitigating the small population size engendered by gigantism. They 
did not masticate, increasing food intake. They had a distinctive small-head-and-long-neck 
morphological structure, which maximizes grazing range while minimizing movement. 
These primitive characteristics were supplemented by new adaptations. Gigantism itself protected 
against the increasingly sophisticated predators of the Jurassic, and accommodated the enormous 
digestive system mitigating the lack of mastication and gastric mill. Their basal metabolic rate increased 
to accommodate the speedy growth required.  Sauropods evolved a distinctive pneumatized skeleton, a 
signal of a bird-like respiratory system, which increases the efficiency of oxygen dispersal and 
accommodates the growth rate required to reach gigantic size. 
The road to gigantism was open to sauropods due to their distinctive primitive characteristics. The road 
was followed due to the evolution of particular adaptations in response to particular evolutionary 
pressures. The explanation of sauropod gigantism is a complex narrative: there is no appeal to a general 
model in explanation, but rather a unique, detailed causal sequence is employed. 
1.3 Simple & Complex Narratives 
In explaining snowball earth and sauropod gigantism historical scientists follow two distinct explanatory 
strategies. Both are narrative explanations: their explananda are individual cases, accounted for via 
particular causal sequences. However, snowball earth is explained as an extreme case of a general 
model. Sauropod gigantism is not. Moreover, the Snowball Earth contains less causal detail than 
sauropod gigantism. The geological case is simple, while the paleobiological case is complex3. Two 
features, an explanation’s detail and embeddedness, are characteristic of simple and complex narratives. 
It is worth reiterating that these distinctions may well illuminate sciences not typically considered 
historical, or dealing with narratives. It is beyond this paper’s scope to discuss such cases, but I take it 
that if simple and complex explanations of particular events occur in ahistorical sciences, this only 
strengthens the importance of the distinction. 
Detail 
A striking difference between the two explanations is the level of detail required. Detail is a measure of 
the specificity, complexity and diffusion of the explanans required for explanatory adequacy. Snowball 
                                                          
3
 The distinction between complex and simple is similar in spirit to ‘actual sequence’ and ‘robust process’ 
explanations (Sterelny 1996, Jackson & Pettit 1992), although is not cashed out in overtly modal terms.   
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earth is low- detail: few factors and a single difference-maker are required. General facts about global 
albedo, temperature, atmosphere and icepack work in tandem with particular facts about landmass 
clustering to produce the explanandum. Sauropod gigantism, by contrast, requires a more detailed 
explanation. Adequacy requires many explanans, quite disparate in nature. Important explanatory 
details are spread through time: from deeply primitive characteristics such as oviparity, to highly derived 
ones like pneumatization. Explanans are also spread across grain: oviparity is important because it 
mitigates evolutionary, population-level concerns while pneumatization solves individual-level, 
physiological concerns.  
Detail, then, tracks the complexity required for explanatory adequacy, and its nature depends in part on 
the explanandum. In the snowball earth case, the world cooperates in granting sufficiency to low detail 
explanations while for sauropod gigantism the distended, messy nature of the explanandum demands a 
more detailed, messy explanation. 
Embeddedness 
A narrative explanation is embedded when the explanandum is accounted for as a token of a type of 
process; an instance of a regularity. The relative simplicity of the snowball earth explanation allows it to 
be represented by a single climatological model. The hypothesis is an extreme case of run of the mill 
dynamics between ice cover, geography, climate and atmosphere. In explaining why the earth froze, I 
tell you about those general dynamics and how the scenario would arise given particular states of 
affairs. Sauropod gigantism, by contrast, is an exquisite corpse: birds provide a model for respiratory 
systems; giraffes, swans and structural morphology tell us something about possible sauropod stances; 
elephants and large lizards about possible metabolism.  There is no single unifying regularity which can 
be appealed to. In explaining gigantism, I refer to particular facts about the sauropod lineage and the 
environment in which it evolved.  
I have mentioned that some philosophers take narrative explanations as problematic insofar as they do 
not appeal to regularities, and that I will not take a stance on this here. With embeddedness on the 
table, I can clarify this. Clearly embedded explanations appeal to regularities: the interesting question is 
whether non-embedded explanations do, or must. I am inclined to see non-embedded explanations as 
leaning on a patchwork of regularities. For instance, models of structural morphology, population 
genetics and metabolism are all appealed to in explanations of sauropod gigantism. However, it is open 
for others to argue that such appeals are not always required. 
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Embeddedness, then, tells us whether an explanandum is accounted for as an instance of a general 
model, or as an individual event. 
Simple & Complex 
Call an explanation which is high in detail, and not embedded, a complex narrative. Call an explanation 
with is low in detail and embedded a simple narrative. Complex and simple narratives are two distinct 
explanatory strategies employed by historical scientists. 
To drive the distinction home, compare the explanation of gigantism in sauropods to cases of island 
gigantism. The six-foot, tree climbing, predatory Fossa of Madagascar, for instance, evolved from much 
smaller mongoose-like ancestors. Because islands are isolated and tend to lack diversity, diminutive 
lineages are likely to form founder populations and radiate into unusual niches. This can lead to island 
gigantism: a lack of predation, and selection pressure to fill empty niches, drives size increase. The Fossa 
are gigantic because the isolation of Madagascar set up the preconditions for island gigantism. Fossa are 
amenable to a simple explanation: embedded in general explanations of island biogeography and 
requiring minimal detail. To explain fossa gigantism, I need only explain the general model of island 
gigantism, and then show how fossa met the model’s conditions for evolving large size. Sauropod 
gigantism, by contrast, begs a complex explanation: more detail is required and there is no general 
regularity to subsume the explanandum. 
Detail and embeddedness come apart in principle, but in practice tend to be coupled. Embedded 
explanations tend to be low in detail as explanatory sufficiency is determined by the strictures of the 
model. To get the Snowball Earth explanation, I show that the antecedent conditions of the model were 
met – and this only requires reference to causal factors from that model. This allows many causal details 
to be ignored, making for a low-detail explanation. Non-embedded explanations tend to require more 
detail as they cannot rely on general regularities to discount causal factors. In the Sauropod case, we 
require separate convincing of each step in the explanation. There may be cases of embedded, high 
detail explanations as well as low detail, unembedded explanations, but these are rare. 
A simple narrative explanation, then, does not require a detailed treatment as the explanandum is 
represented in a general model. A complex narrative requires specific details unique to the case at hand 
and is not subsumed under a particular model. 
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This distinction is important. First, it explains two divergent approaches to understanding the 
explanatory unity of narratives. In Hull’s treatments (1975, 1989) narrative explanations owe their unity 
in part to the integrity of the historical entity they target. “The role of the central subject is to form the 
main strand around which the historical narrative is woven (255).” According to Hull, accounts of 
sauropod gigantism and snowball earth are explanatory in virtue of picking out central subjects (spatio-
temporally distended objects), and providing a coherent narrative about that subject. 
By contrast, Glennan (2010) argues that narrative explanations operate through ephemeral mechanisms. 
By his lights, historical scientists explain states of affairs by showing that the preconditions for a general 
mechanism are in place. Such mechanisms are unusual due to their contingent (hence ‘ephemeral’) 
nature, but still deliver robust results given that arrangement. The characteristics of early sauropods, or 
the continental arrangement of the Neoproterozoic, are highly contingent states of affairs. But given 
those states of affairs, we get general results: gigantism and a general freeze (see Gallie 1959 for a 
similar view). 
For Hull then, part of a narrative’s explanatory unity is due to their central subject. For Glennan, unity is 
owed to regularities. This disagreement is resolved when we see that narrative explanations take two 
different forms. In simple cases, historical scientists appeal to general models which subsume the target 
case as Glennan envisions. In complex cases, explanatory force might be supplied by historical entities as 
Hull sees it. 
Second, the distinction shows that historical scientists are not unified in their approach to explanation. 
They pursue two distinct strategies which require separate philosophical treatments. I illustrate this in 
reference to mechanistic explanation. It turns out that simple narratives can receive a mechanistic gloss, 
while some complex narratives are not mechanistic. Showing this is the task of the second half of the 
paper. 
2. Mechanistic explanation 
Mechanistic explanation has proven an illuminating account of actual scientific practice (see Bechtel & 
Richardson 1993, Glennan 2002, Craver 2007, Woodward 2002, Machamer, Darden et al 2000) In this 
section I sketch the account, then discuss how it may be extended to cover population-level explanation. 
Discussing narrative explanation in the context of mechanistic explanation will show that 1) simple 
narrative explanations are unified with population-level explanations (but not with complex narrative 
explanations) and 2) not all scientific explanations are mechanistic (as some complex narratives are not). 
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There are reasons to compare mechanistic and narrative explanation. First, there is a tension between 
historical explanation and models of explanations referring to hierarchical structure, such as reduction. 
Traditional models of reduction require explanation to refer to general laws which are realized at ‘more 
fundamental’ levels of description than the explanandum. Such laws are not overtly appealed to in 
historical explanation. Mechanistic explanation is intended to replace reductive models (Craver 2005, 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005), retaining their advantages but avoiding imperialistic and nomological 
pitfalls. If mechanistic explanation is such a replacement, we might wonder whether the tension 
between historical and structural explanation is retained. 
Second, as 2.2 covers, there is interest in the limits of mechanistic explanation. Is mechanistic 
explanation a general account of scientific explanation, or is it one of many explanatory strategies 
scientists might follow? 
As we shall see, the tension between historical and structural explanation is retained in some complex 
narratives. In such cases scientists do not attempt mechanistic explanations because the unembedded, 
high-detail nature of the explanation undermines the utility of a mechanistic approach. And for the 
same reason mechanistic explanation has limited scope: scientists are not just in the mechanism 
business, sometimes they are in the complex narrative business. 
Third, understanding the nature of historical explanation is a worthy philosophical task and its 
relationship to mechanistic accounts is illuminating. I have already shown that narrative explanation is 
disjunctive between simple and complex strategies. As we shall see, simple narratives are unified with 
population-level explanations via their common ‘mechanistic’ nature, while complex narratives are the 
odd ones out. 
2.1 A sketch 
In this section I aim to provide a minimal set of conditions required for any explanation to be presented 
mechanistically. In explaining a mechanism I must identify the phenomenon I am concerned with, break 
it into components, and explain the phenomenon’s behavior in terms of the causal and organizational 
properties of the components.  For the purposes of this paper, I will take an explanation to be 
mechanistic if it meets the following criteria: 
1) Localization: the phenomenon is a discrete system with discrete components 
2) Constitution: systems are constitutively explained in terms of components 
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3) Nested Causation: behaviors of systems are explained in terms of the causal and relational 
properties of components 
This sketch is certainly not exhaustive of all that is important and distinctive about mechanistic 
explanation. However, it is a minimal set of conditions which I hope mechanists of all stripes would 
agree with and are all I need for present purposes. It is clear that more needs to be said about 
localization: what is meant by ‘discrete’, and how does it restrict the scope of mechanistic explanations? 
I will put this question aside until 2.2. 
Many sciences are characteristically mechanistic. Cytologists understand cells as discrete parcels 
composed of a cellular anatomy which determines behavior. Neuroscientists identify neural networks as 
systems fulfilling particular functions governed by activation patterns within them. Molecular geneticists 
identify genes with particular DNA sequences which code for proteins given the right inputs and 
organization. Chemists explain phase-transitions as the result of the interaction between kinetic energy 
and chemical bonds in a system. All follow mechanistic explanation’s distinctive pattern. 
However, some scientific endeavors look different. Ecologists, economists and evolutionary biologists 
use abstract models to explain the behavior of populations. Paleontologists, geologists and 
archaeologists construct narrative explanations of events in the deep past. Using abstract models to 
explain population-level phenomena and using causal sequences to explain past states of affairs appear 
very different from the explanations mechanists examine. In the next section, we see whether 
mechanistic explanation can account for these as well. 
2.2 ‘Liberalism’ about mechanistic explanation 
Consider two views on the scope of mechanistic explanation. By a conservative view the model has thin 
scope - it is true of some, but not all, scientific explanations.  A liberal view takes the model to have wide 
scope – most, perhaps all, scientific explanations are mechanistic. Liberalism involves showing that 
various explanatory schema are subsumed by mechanistic accounts, and this may involve tweaking the 
conditions sketched above.  
Let’s start with two examples. Bechtel (2011) argues that mechanistic explanation must include dynamic 
causal streams to capture biological phenomena which display non-linear behavior, such as cellular self-
repair. It is not obvious that mechanists ever intended their models to be rigidly linear, and moreover 
expanding the account to include dynamic mechanisms doesn’t seem to conflict with anything essential 
 11 
 
to the sketch above. By contrast, Rusanen and Lappi (2007) argue that some cognitive phenomena are 
beyond the scope of mechanistic models as they require top-down explanation. This clashes with 
constitution: instead of the phenomenon being explained in terms of its parts, the parts are explained 
via the phenomenon. If they are right, mechanists have a choice between the conservative move of 
taking some cognitive explanations non-mechanistically, or the liberal move of altering the requirement 
of constitution. Some cases, then, are more or less challenging to the model.  
A liberal move pertinent to comparing narrative and mechanistic explanation is discussed by 
Matthewson & Calcott (2011). They argue that explanations of population-level phenomena, such as 
market cycles and predator/prey dynamics, can be understood mechanistically. I argue that simple 
narrative explanations can be understood in the same way. 
Matthewson & Calcott distinguish between mechanisms and mechanistic models. A mechanism is a 
concrete object with localizable, discrete components. A mechanistic model takes the structure of 
mechanistic explanation and applies it to non-mechanisms. It is not clear whether economies, ecologies 
or cities are mechanisms, but we may successfully explain them as if they were. In explaining their 
target, modelers entertain the fiction (Godfrey-Smith 2009) or the idealization (Weisberg 2007) that it is 
a mechanism, enabling them to employ mechanistic explanation. 
 
Take an evolutionary explanation of a shift in the proportion of some trait, t, in a population across two 
subsequent generations, G1 and G2. In G1 t is less common than it is in G2. To explain this change, a 
biologist might refer to a model which considers the population in terms of various traits with various 
fitness-values. The makeup of the population at one generation is determined by the fitness values of 
the traits present in the generation before. Because of t’s fitness value, it outperformed some other 
traits in reproducing between G1 and G2 and was thus more common in the later generation. Whether 
this is a mechanistic explanation depends upon its interaction with the conditions I outlined above. 
 
The explanation is mechanistic, with a tweak. First, it involves decomposition: the population is 
understood as comprising either individuals or traits with fitness-values. Second, it involves nested 
causation4: the change between the two generations is explained as the result of the interacting fitness 
                                                          
4
 This example is meant to be illustrative, and skates over some difficult issues in biology. Some philosophers 
(Walsh, Lewens & Arieu 2002; Walsh 2010) deny that fitness is truly causal, insisting that only the particular life-
events of individuals in the population are the proper locus of causal power – and thus calling this ‘nested 
causation’ is a mistake. Fair enough, but I think this perspective is in fact amenable to the story I am telling. First, 
 12 
 
values of the components. However, the phenomenon does not appear to be a discrete system. Few 
real-world biological populations have discrete, non-overlapping generations and even fewer have 
populations as discrete as the model represents. And yet the system is treated as if it were a discrete, 
localizable system. Matthewson & Calcott can retain the first tenet by allowing for idealized, or 
metaphorical localization. Something like: 
 
Localization*: the phenomena either is a discrete system, or may be treated like a discrete 
system 
 
Until now I have avoided explicit discussion of what is meant by ‘discreteness’, but it is time to draw this 
out. A discrete system is not necessarily such in virtue of spatio-temporal location, but rather the causal 
integration of its parts. It has discrete components insofar as they are modular: they perform particular, 
identifiable and perhaps extractable functions in the context of that system (this account is meant to be 
broadly aligned with Wimsatt’s (2007)).   A clockwork machine can be a paradigmatically discrete 
system. It is discrete in terms of causal integration: the behaviors of clockwork (keeping time, say) 
depend upon the interaction of a specific set of contained parts. Moreover, the components are 
modular: the various cogs and wheels can be removed from the system and play identifiable roles within 
it. When Matthewson & Calcott argue that population-level explanations are capturable by mechanistic 
models, they simply idealize from a paradigmatically discrete system, to a less clear case. 
 
‘Discreteness’, as I understand it, is clearly graded; and this should make localization* unproblematic for 
mechanists – most accounts of mechanistic explanation already commit to something like this. Indeed, 
discussion of mechanistic explanation is rife with discussion of idealization. And so a clockwork machine 
is quite discrete. A neural network is less so: although neuroscientists individuate networks via 
examining neuroanatomy and firing patterns, complex overlapping and interrelation exists between the 
entities in the system. The more the example diverges from an ideally discrete system, the more 
metaphorical in character the mechanistic explanation of it becomes. This has consequences for the 
process of localization applied in different cases. For more ‘machine-like’ cases, such as clockwork, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
one might claim that non-causal factors are here presented as if they were causal, and so ‘nested causation’ is, like 
localization, receiving a fictionalist treatment. Second, one could claim that ‘fitness’ in the this context is merely a 
term of art meant to unite whatever truly causal factors in fact lead to the births and deaths which occur within 
the population. Moreover, the main concern of such philosophers is whether explanations appealing to fitness 
should be read as mathematical explanations – and discussion of the relationship between mathematical and 
mechanistic explanations is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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are more able to ‘read’ the system from the world. The components of the mechanistic model map onto 
components in the world. In less ‘machine-like’ cases, a process of simplification, abstraction or 
idealization is required. The ‘fitness value’ of some trait, for instance, does not obviously (if at all) map 
onto components in the real world system. They rather pick out explanatorily salient features of the 
target. Representing population-level phenomena as discrete systems requires that we ignore certain 
causal factors. This is not, of course, an original claim – indeed I think it is necessary for understanding 
mechanistic explanations, but it is worth restating for as we shall see, although such idealizations occur 
in simple narrative explanations, they do not in many complex cases. 
 
And so Matthewson & Calcott are able to present many of the explanations in population-level science 
as mechanistic insofar as they accept a ‘fictionalist’ turn in localization. Given that many paradigm 
examples of mechanistic explanation (neural networks, gene sequences) are themselves only ideally 
discrete this change is not too problematic. However, the process of localization changes depending on 
the discreteness of the system: for characteristically mechanistic phenomena the system can be ‘read 
off’ the world, for other cases a process of simplification is required. The final section brings this liberal 
account of mechanistic explanation together with narrative explanation. 
 
3. Mechanistic Narratives? 
 
Let’s take stock. Narrative explanations, which explain individual events via causal sequences, take two 
distinct strategies: 
 
Simple narratives, which 1) explain an event as a state of a general model, 2) contain minimal detail; 
 
Complex narratives, which 1) explain the event via a unique causal sequence, 2) are highly detailed. 
 
To be mechanistic, an explanation must meet three criteria: localization, constitution and nested 
causation. Via a fictionalist tweak to localization, population-level explanations can be seen as 
mechanistic. 
 
This section argues that 1) simple narrative explanations are mechanistic in the same sense as 
population-level explanations as they are an instance of the same explanatory strategy; 2) some 
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complex narratives are not mechanistic. The upshot of these two points is that liberalism about 
mechanisms is restricted (as there are scientific explanations which are not mechanistic) and that simple 
narratives have more in common with non-historical explanations (such as those from economics, 
sociology and ecology) than complex narratives. 
 
3.1 Simple Narratives as Mechanistic Models 
 
Population-level explanations and simple narrative explanations are unified. The economist treats real 
world markets as if they were discrete mechanisms, the evolutionary biologist imagines an island eco-
system as constituted by various ecological roles waiting to be filled by genealogical actors. My exemplar 
simple narrative, Snowball Earth, is also an exemplar mechanistic model. 
 
An explanatory model is mechanistic when it meets the three criteria, with the fictionalist turn described 
in 2.2. The phenomenon must be treated as if it were a discrete system with discrete components. It 
must be described constitutively. Its behavior must be explained as the result of interactions between its 
components. Consider the explanation sketched in 1.1. Presumably the real-world interrelation between 
ice-cover, atmosphere and global temperatures are extremely complex. The explanation, however, is 
straightforward: paleoclimatologists are able to abstract from the details and present a simple model of 
the interactions. The highly interrelated, complex system is treated as if it were a simple, discrete 
system. Localization holds. This idealized system is constituted by various components, namely: global 
temperature, icepack cover, the locations of landmasses and global albedo. Constitution holds. And the 
system’s behavior is ruled by the causal relationships between those components. As albedo increases 
and the atmosphere thins due to landmasses clustering around the equator, a feedback involving 
decreasing temperature, increasing ice cover, and increasing albedo leads to a snowball earth scenario. 
Nested causation holds. 
 
Although simple narratives and population-level models are both instances of the same explanatory 
strategy, it does not follow that scientists concerned with discovering historical facts face identical 
epistemic challenges, or use the same methods, as sciences concerned with population-level facts. It 
may be that ecologists and economists employ the modeler’s strategy to deal with the over-abundance 
of facts pertaining to their explananda, while historical scientists use it to gain access to the scarcity of 
traces available from the past. My point is about the unity of explanatory strategies. 
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3.2 Complex Narratives are not Mechanistic 
 
Scientists providing complex narratives do not attempt to embed their explanations in an overarching 
system, but rather provide a causal sequence which reasonably leads to the state of affairs in question.  
Typically, scientists providing complex narratives do not describe a localized system and do not take the 
explanans as system-components. They are not mechanistic.  
 
Sauropod gigantism could in principle be explained via a ‘gigantism mechanism’ whereby a diminutive 
lineage is fed into a massively complicated idealized machine, outputted as giants millions of years later. 
But scientists do not explain them in those terms. Rather the history of a particular lineage is explained 
in reference to various causal factors interacting with it. Geologists explain Snowball Earth by 
representing the target as a mechanistic model. It is simplified to a localized system. There is less 
simplification in the sauropod case: scientists do not see the lineage as a system. After all, what would 
such a system look like? The explanans paleobiologists appeal to are at many temporary and hierarchical 
grains, and it is not obvious whether such a disparate group is amenable to unified representation. 
Moreover, there is a difference between a unified model and a conjunction of different (perhaps 
incommensurable) models. Explanans are not ‘components’ but rather causal factors which influenced 
the particular pathway the lineage took. 
 
The point is this: even if the explanation can be described in mechanistic terms, that is not the 
explanation’s form. 
 
Why not? The process of localization is opaque for complex narratives due to a tension between 
providing a simple, tractable model and meeting the high-detail requirements of the explanation. 
Mechanistic approaches are attractive when the world cooperates: either the explanandum is a discrete, 
decomposable system or it is simple and unified enough to be helpfully treated as such. In at least some 
complex narratives, the requirement for high detail and the unavailability of a general regularity 
conspire to undermine the utility of a mechanistic conception. 
 
Historical scientists, then, are not always mechanists. Faced with a complex, messy world they 
sometimes respond with complex, messy explanations. 
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 Conclusion 
 
I have argued that historical scientists follow two distinct explanatory strategies. Simple narratives 
typically idealize and abstract away from their target and are amenable to a mechanistic gloss. Complex 
narratives are different: some do not admit of mechanistic treatments. When providing complex 
narratives, historical scientists are not mechanists. This points to a host of new questions. Are there 
situations when simple or complex approaches are more appropriate? I have suggested that the nature 
of explananda play an important role in applicability, but much more remains to be said. Ought we 
prefer simple or complex narratives? I have said nothing about the value such explanations have. I am 
inclined to think of the strategies as geared towards different explanatory interests and kinds of 
explananda, and so validity turns on context. However, the floor is still open for those who prefer one 
over the other. Historically philosophers have preferred the kind of unified explanations offered by 
simple narratives but in some cases complex narratives may be more testable. As Kim Sterelny has 
pointed out to me (personal communication), a detailed narrative will have more points of empirical 
contact with the world, and so may have more opportunities for testing. 
 
Finally, do other sciences have similar divisions? I have presented a unified picture of some of the 
explanations furnished by ecologists and economists on the one hand, and paleontologists and 
geologists on the other. It will be interesting to see whether some population-level explanations diverge 
from this pattern, and whether other areas of science can be carved up along similar lines. Moreover, I 
have not claimed that narrative explanations are unique to historical science (although they may be 
paradigmatic of them), and an investigation into whether the distinction between complex and simple 
narratives is useful outside of that context is also in the offing. 
 
 Attending to the different strategies historical scientists employ in their explanations illuminates 
important philosophical issues, and helps us understand the nature of their work. 
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